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Abstract
Recent attention to shareholder activism in the business and 
academic press has ignored the legal ramifications of that 
phenomenon.  Under current law, shareholders are neither 
principals nor agents of the corporation, the board of directors, or 
the other shareholders; those seeking to increase shareholder power 
must confront this legal reality.  Specifically, proposals for 
increased shareholder power on the one hand and recent investor 
attempts to gain actual management control on the other must both 
be considered in light of the shareholders’ lack of fiduciary 
responsibility.  Moreover, all directors, including those 
representing “activist” shareholders, are obligated to exercise 
independent judgment about the best interests of the corporation 
and may not delegate their decision-making duty either to an 
individual activist shareholder or to an electoral majority of 
shareholders. 
 
A quiet (or at least obscure) corner of corporate law academia continues to debate the 
“trend” (if it is a trend and not a sudden lumpy apparition) toward imposing fiduciary duties on 
controlling shareholders.1 There are a number of people who believe this is not and should not 
be the law, and I am one of those people.  I have tried elsewhere2 to counter the arguments in 
favor of imposing fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders and I will not repeat those 
 
*Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University.  An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools in July, 2006. 
1See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company:  
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005); F. 
HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & TOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS §§ 7:3-7:6 (2d ed. 2005); Robert B. Thompson, The 
Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). 
2See Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 175 (2004). 
2arguments here.  The crux of my argument is that fiduciary duties are owed by those who have 
power, in the legal, “Hohfeldian,” sense, over other people’s persons or property.  In the 
corporate context, that is directors.  Shareholders may have indirect power or influence, but they 
have no legal power over corporate property, and certainly no legal power over other 
shareholders’ property.  They have power only over their own property (their shares) – a fact the 
law recognizes by zealously protecting the shareholder’s right to vote3 and to sell his or her 
shares.4
Developments since the turn-of-the-millennium financial scandals (commonly referred to 
as “Enron”), have both confirmed my earlier arguments and raised new issues.  For one thing, 
the scandals have revealed that it is not only minority shareholders in closely held corporations 
who are subject to exploitation and oppression.  More interestingly, since Enron we have seen an 
increase in “shareholder activism”.  Some of this activism – efforts to improve governance in 
public companies or to rein in executive pay – may be a fairly direct response to the excesses that 
the Enron era exposed.5 Another form of activism, generally engaged in by hedge funds, 
involves attempts directly to affect, and often to control, management decisions.  This latter kind 
of activism seems related to the Enron phenomenon only chronologically, although it perhaps is 
 
3See, e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-660 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
4See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 762 (Del. Ch. 2006); Zetlin v. 
Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). 
5See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005); Imam Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder 
Power (Aug. 2005), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-16, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044. 
3a response to related changes in the market.  Both kinds of activism raise questions about 
fiduciary duties in public corporations that have yet to be addressed.6
Most of the discussion of shareholder activism has been informed by practical economic 
and financial considerations rather than legal ones.  Law exists, however, and it will apply to 
business developments such as shareholder governance proposals and hedge-fund activism.  It is 
therefore necessary to understand the relevant law and to consider recent developments in the 
context of the current legal environment.  To that end, I begin with a brief review of fiduciary 
law, specifically the fact that fiduciary duties apply only to those who have legal power over 
another’s person or property.  In Part II I review the legal relationship between shareholders and 
boards of directors, which is ordinarily a contractual one without fiduciary duties on either side 
and is not, as some have suggested, a principal-agent relationship.  In Part III I briefly examine 
how the Enron-era scandals shed further light on the arguments about shareholders fiduciary 
duties.  Finally, in Parts IV and V I discuss current trends in "shareholder activism" and how 
those trends should be understood in light of the law of fiduciary duties. 
 
I.  Introduction to Fiduciary Duties, Again
In order to decide whether some class of persons owes a fiduciary duty, one must first 
determine what gives rise to fiduciary duties in the first place.  Because fiduciary duties arose in 
the ad hoc common law way, we do not have a clear explanation for their existence.  However, it 
 
6For commentary addressing some of these issues, see Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty 
to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders? 60 BUS. LAW. 1 (2004) (raising 
questions about institutional investor activity generally); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate 
4is generally accepted that what makes a fiduciary a fiduciary is her power to make decisions with 
regard to another person’s property or person.7 Because of that power, the fiduciary must act in 
the best interests of the other person.  A power creates a fiduciary duty if it enables the fiduciary 
to make decisions that are legally enforceable and can result in liability for the beneficiary.  This 
is “power” in the traditional Hohfeldian sense, and it correlates to a resulting liability in the 
beneficiary.8
Although the fiduciary has the legal power to bind the beneficiary, the beneficiary 
sometimes has the legal right to control the fiduciary.  That control is an essential feature of the 
agency relationship, for example.9 Other beneficiaries, however, do not have control over their 
fiduciaries.  If a trust beneficiary tells her trustee to “invest in this great new stock I just read 
about in a chat room”, and the trustee refuses, the beneficiary has no legal redress.10 Similarly, 
 
America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 ___ (2006) (noting the agency problems that exist between 
investment managers of institutional investors and the investors in the funds). 
7See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901 A.2d 106, 113-114 (Del. 2006); 
sources cited at Dalley, supra note X, at 208 n.183.  See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (2002) (describing fiduciary duties as method of 
preventing “expropriation by the contracting party with control over the assets” of the other 
party); id. at 37 (noting that “agency costs are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in 
someone other than the residual claimant”). 
8See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 44-47 (1913).  Some fiduciaries, such as trustees and 
corporate directors, might be said to have a right to control, which would make them more 
powerful (in the colloquial sense) and perhaps subject to stricter duties, as discussed below. 
9See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship which results from manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other 
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act”). 
10A trust beneficiary’s remedies are limited to specific enforcement of the trust or claims 
for breach of trust.  See IIIA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 
199 (4th ed. 1988).  The beneficiary’s lack of legal control over the trustee can also be inferred 
5corporations do not have control over their fiduciaries.11 Some principals, although they are 
legally empowered to exercise control, are in fact unable to exercise meaningful control over 
their agents because of a lack of knowledge or skill.  Unsophisticated clients of attorneys and 
stock brokers are often as a practical matter completely at the mercy of their agents.  This 
difference in the degree of actual control that the beneficiary has over the fiduciary might 
account for differences in the nature of the fiduciary relationship and the strictness of its rules,12 
such as the “no further inquiry” rule in trusts, which absolutely prohibits a trustee from 
transacting with the trust property even if the transaction would benefit the trust or the 
beneficiary.13 Similarly, until recently trustees had no duty to disclose information, however 
 
from the fact that a beneficiary need not have the capacity to make a contract, see 2 AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 12.5 (5th ed. 2006), and that the beneficiary ordinarily has no 
power to remove a trustee.  See id. § 11.10.3. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
cmt. g, at 43 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001). 
11The primary beneficiary of a corporate board’s fiduciary duties is the corporation, see 
infra note X, which of course cannot exercise control because it is not a real person.  Thus, a 
corporate board is not an agent.  Rather, its powers are “original and undelegated”.  See People 
ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911).  See also infra, Part II. 
12It is sometimes said that partnership fiduciary duties are stronger than corporate duties.  
See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975).  I have argued 
elsewhere that this is not the case.  See Dalley, supra note X, at 191.  However, there might be a 
justification for stricter partnership duties because partners are fully and personally liable for the 
acts of their partners, and because each partner is both an agent and a principal, so that one 
partner (as principal) cannot either legally or practically “control” another (as agent).  See id. at 
187-190.  Neither of these is true for closely held corporations, and it is therefore inappropriate 
to apply partner fiduciary duties to close corporations, whether those duties are stricter or not.  
See id. 
13See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest? 114 YALE L.J. 929, 931-932 (2005).  Professor Langbein describes a number of reasons 
why the sole interest rule is outdated and should be abandoned.  He does not address the feature 
of trusts that disempowers the beneficiary from controlling the trustee. 
6material, to beneficiaries unless the beneficiary inquired,14 presumably because there was 
nothing the beneficiary could do with the information.  However, the amount of control that a 
beneficiary has over the fiduciary is not an essential feature of a fiduciary relationship.  Only the 
fiduciary’s power to bind the beneficiary is necessary. 
 To give rise to a fiduciary duty, the fiduciary’s power over the beneficiary must be a legal 
one; that is, it must give rise to legal liability on the part of the beneficiary.  Many relationships 
are characterized by one person’s ability to affect the life and behavior of another without the 
ability to legally bind the other.15 I call this “moral control”.  Some close personal relationships, 
such as those between parents and adult children or spouses, have this feature.  Moral control is 
not the same as legal power.  Consider the relationship between a person of weak character and a 
person of dominating will.  The dominating personality may control the weaker one, even to the 
point of affecting decisions the weaker partner makes.  But the power is not a legal one:  If the 
dominant character purports to enter into a contract for the submissive one without authority or 
ratification, the law will not enforce the contract against the weak character.  Correlatively, the 
stronger character is not subject to a duty to protect the interests of the other person.16 
14See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §173 cmt. d (1959).  Today, a trustee must 
disclose information where necessary to protect a beneficiary’s interests.  UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§813(a), 7C U.L.A. 239 (Supp.).  This would occur, perhaps, where the beneficiary might want 
to claim breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise seek equitable relief challenging the action of the 
trustee. 
15See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b(1) (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1), at 36 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001). 
16What fun would moral control be, if it had to be exercised in the best interests of the 
other party? 
7This is not to say that moral control is never legally relevant.  The law has recognized 
that moral control – the “position of trust and confidence” – can give rise to special duties in 
making contracts, for example.17 It is also legally recognized in the law defining conflicts of 
interest.  Thus, where a director is accused of being “dominated and controlled” by an interested 
director, the first director is deemed to be tainted by the interest.18 This is true even though the 
interested director’s power of control is not legally enforceable.19 However, these are cases 
where the law is attempting to determine the quality of an actor’s decision-making – whether a 
contract is truly based on consent or whether a director was acting based on her own good faith 
judgment.  Moral control is not relevant for deciding whether a person has legal power over 
another’s person or property and thus owes a fiduciary duty. 
 
II.  The Relationship Between Shareholders and the Board 
At the risk of stating the obvious, I now proceed to examine the legal relationship 
between the shareholders and board.  To begin, it is worth noting that there are a variety of 
actual relationships the shareholders and the board may have.  In small corporations, for 
example, the shareholders and the directors may be the same people.  The relationship among 
those people will vary widely and may have no structure other than that required by law.20 
17See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1979) (noting that non-
disclosure is equivalent to an assertion when it concerns a fact that a person is entitled to know 
because of a “relation of trust and confidence”). 
18See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995). 
19See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984). 
20If the corporation has regular counsel, it may hold periodic meetings, either real or 
fictitious, of directors and shareholders. 
8Actual Relationships 
In very large corporations, there may be no actual relationship at all between any of the 
shareholders and the board, except to the extent the board members themselves own shares and 
to the extent the occasional shareholder shows up at the annual meeting.  The company will have 
an “investor relations” page on its website, but it may take a shareholder a while even to find it.  
The shareholders have invested in the hope that the company will make money, but they do not 
care how the company does so.  In short, they are passive investors.  As many others have 
pointed out, they are passive not only by choice, but because they lack the time, expertise, and 
incentive to participate in management.21 This will be especially true if their holdings are highly 
diversified.  They rely on the board to make business decisions based on the board’s judgment 
and expertise, not based on some idea of what the shareholders might want (other than 
profitability).  In this respect, one might say that the large publicly traded corporation functions 
as a republic rather than a democracy.22 
Even in large companies with dispersed shareholders, there are some matters that are of 
interest to the shareholders if only because the shareholders are required to vote on them: the 
election of directors, the amendment of the certificate of incorporation, and fundamental changes 
such as mergers and the sale of all or substantially all the assets.  The procedures applicable to 
such matters, such as voting structures and antitakeover devices, are also relevant to the 
shareholders.  In addition, any matter that reduces or enhances the likelihood that the board and 
 
21See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 201-203.  Professor Bainbridge also notes that 
shareholder passivity has been a feature of corporate life for centuries, see id. at 196-197. 
9management will in fact seek to maximize the profitability of the enterprise (rather than their 
own wealth) will be important to a shareholder who is paying attention.  Institutions, such as 
pension and mutual funds, are often shareholders who “pay attention” for a variety of reasons, 
and their “activism” has therefore attracted considerable scholarly attention.23 Even institutional 
shareholders will nevertheless be largely passive with respect to day-to-day, or even relatively 
major, management decisions. 
 Other smaller corporations may operate on a true democracy or oligarchic model.  Most 
shareholders will have representation on the board, but the degree to which they have influence 
will vary widely.  In businesses owned by entrepreneurs and venture capital investors, for 
example, the relationship between the shareholders will be highly structured by contract, and the 
venture capitalists may expect to have direct input on business matters in some circumstances.24 
In family businesses, on the other hand, the patriarch or matriarch may completely dominate 
decision-making with the expectation that the other owners (who may be second or third 
generation family members) will tag along as best they can.25 
Legal Relationship: Principal and Agent? 
22This is presumably the origin of the title of Vice Chancellor Strine’s reply to Professor 
Bebchuk.  See Strine, supra note X. Cf. Bebchuk, supra note X, at 837 (describing the American 
corporation as a “representative democracy”). 
23See infra Part IV.    
24See Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance and 
Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Ventures, and Family Businesses (March 2006), ECGI 
Working Paper Series in Law No. 65/2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894785, at 27-
28; 42-47. 
25See id. at 35-37.  See also Phred Dvorak & Jaclyn Badal, Relative Problems, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 2006, at B1. 
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 The actual relationship between shareholders and boards can be and has been carefully 
examined from economic, behavioralist, finance and other perspectives.  The legal relationship 
between shareholders and boards must, however, be examined from a legal perspective.  That 
legal relationship is superimposed on the actual relationship (if any) between the board and the 
shareholders.  As noted above, the shareholders elect the directors and vote on fundamental 
matters.  Other than that, however, the shareholders have no legal role in the corporation and no 
further legal relations with the directors.  They can bring a derivative suit and thereby attract the 
attention of the board, but there is no requirement that the board make itself available for 
shareholder input.  The directors, meanwhile, are fiduciaries because they have legal power over 
the corporation (or, if you prefer, the assets and legal rights and obligations that comprise the 
corporation).  To whom are those fiduciary duties owed?  The law clearly describes those duties 
as owed to the corporation and all its shareholders.26 Most of the time this proposition is not 
particularly troublesome as a practical matter.  The shareholders are the ultimate, residual 
beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise; if the corporation is profitable, the shareholders’ 
investment will increase in value and everyone will be happy even if that profit is achieved by 
considering interests other than the shareholders’.  Unfortunately, this fact has gotten caught up 
in a policy debate between those who believe that corporate boards can or should consider or in 
some cases prefer other interests (such as those of employees, customers, and all future life on 
the planet) to those of the shareholders.  Reacting to this position, others have argued for a 
 
26See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Guth v. Loft, 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  See also MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 830 (a)(3) (1984). 
11 
“shareholder primacy norm” that requires that boards consider shareholders, and only 
shareholders, in pursuing corporate policy.27 
Of course, if shareholders’ interests are primary, then the primary problem of corporate 
governance is the “agency problem” of boards and management preferring their own interests to 
those of the shareholders.  Thus, the shareholder primacy norm has led by extension to the idea 
that shareholders should have the power to control the board in order to minimize these agency 
costs. This use of the word “agency” has even led some people to refer to the shareholders as 
“principals” and boards as “agents” of the shareholders.28 Principals have the right to control 
their agents, and agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals, so this misuse of agency law 
terminology supports the proposition that shareholders should have more control over boards and 
that boards should seek to advance only the interests of the shareholders.  However, this 
“principal/agent” analysis is simply and unequivocally wrong as a legal matter, and those who 
advocate it are distorting the law to serve their political goals. 
 As is often the case, the two sides of the so-called shareholder/stakeholder debate have 
taken their arguments to untenable extremes.  No sane business person would suggest that a 
board should ignore the interests of the corporation’s employees and customers in order to 
enhance shareholder value.  The idea is oxymoronic.  Similarly, no sane person should expect the 
board of a for-profit corporation intentionally to reduce long-term shareholder value in order to 
improve the lot of workers or whales.  In many instances, a concern for the interests of 
 
27For a summary of this debate and discussion of the relevant issues, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note X, at 410-424. 
12 
employees, customers, and even the general public will improve the profitability of the business 
and therefore enhance shareholder value.29 It is only in rare (but often high-profile) instances, 
such as hostile takeovers, that a board’s seeking to protect the long-term interests of the business 
might adversely affect the shareholders’ ability to realize value on their investments.30 
Defining the interests that the board should consider in carrying out its fiduciary 
responsibilities is not the same, however, as defining the beneficiary of that fiduciary duty.  A 
trustee, for example, is supposed to seek to effectuate the settlor’s intent.31 The settlor is not, 
however, the beneficiary of the trust.  Similarly, the trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the trust 
beneficiaries, but those beneficiaries do not ordinarily have any right to control the acts of the 
trustee.32 Thus, the shareholder/stakeholder debate does not necessarily have anything to do with 
the board’s fiduciary duties. 
 The merits of the shareholder/stakeholder debate are not relevant here, however.  The 
point is to identify the legal relationship between the board and the shareholders without 
 
28See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 97 (2003) (referring to the board as a “quasi-principal” and as 
the “economic agent” of the shareholders).  See also infra notes X and accompanying text. 
29See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 413.  See also Olubunmi Faleye & Emery A. Trahan, 
Is What’s Best for Employees Best for Shareholders (May 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=888180.
30An egregious example of this occurred in Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time 
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), when the Time board denied the shareholders the opportunity to 
sell their shares at a 400% premium in order to protect the long-term interests of the company, 
including its editorial “culture”.  See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 412-413 (discussing 
Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968)). 
31See IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note X, § 232 at p. 7 (noting that the terms of the 
trust can determine how a trustee should balance the interests of multiple beneficiaries). 
32See supra note X. 
13 
allowing the extra-legal rhetoric and economic jargon to mislead us.  Is the board the agent of the 
shareholders?  An agent is a person who has agreed to act on behalf of another person (the 
principal) and subject to that person’s control.33 The principal has a complete right of control 
over the agent, which serves to offset the fact that the principal is vicariously liable for all the 
acts of the agent.  The agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal, including the duty to turn 
over to the principal all profits or other benefits arising from the relationship.  The relationship 
between shareholders and directors has none of these features, and it should therefore be 
apparent that a board is not an agent of the shareholders.34 
Unfortunately, however, the idea that shareholders are the board’s principal has acquired 
some authority.  A few courts have used the language of principal and agent when discussing the 
relationship between the shareholders and the board.  The most important of these cases is 
Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.,35 in which Chancellor Allen held that a board needed a 
compelling justification to interfere with a shareholder vote for directors.  In addition to noting 
the importance of the shareholder franchise to the “legitimacy of directorial power,”36 the 
Chancellor stated that “a decision by the board to act for the primary purpose of preventing the 
effectiveness of a shareholder vote inevitably involves the question who, as between the 
principal and the agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal corporate 
 
33See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). 
34See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2), at 37 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2001). 
35See Blasius Industries, Inc., 564 A.2d at 659-660.  
36Id. at 659. 
14 
governance.”37 Moreover, that “will be true in every instance in which an incumbent board 
seeks to thwart a shareholder majority.”38 Judicial review of a board’s interference with a 
shareholder vote “involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent 
towards his principal.  This is not . . . a question that a court may leave to the agent to decide . . . 
.”39 Although the Delaware Supreme Court has approved the “basic tenets” of Blasius, it has 
generally done so with reference to the legitimating power of the shareholder franchise, not with 
reference to the Chancellor’s use of agency law.40 The exception to this appears in MM 
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,41 in which the Supreme Court quoted, without comment, a 
long passage from Blasius that includes the language quoted above describing the shareholders 
as the board’s principal.42 
37Id. at 659-660 (emphasis added). 
38Id. at 660.  Arguably, under the Chancellor’s reasoning a board would need a 
compelling justification to, for example, refuse to approve an amendment to the certificate of 
incorporation that had been approved by a majority vote of the shareholders.  But see Andrew R. 
Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes?  Responding to 
Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 42-45 (2004) (arguing that the board has a duty to 
make an independent determination about proposals receiving majority shareholder approval, but 
not discussing Blasius). 
39564 A.2d at 660 (emphasis added).   
40See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378 (describing the franchise as the “essence of corporate 
democracy”); Paramount Comm., 637 A.2d at 42 (referring to the “overriding importance of 
voting rights”); Centaur Partners IV, 582 A.2d at 927 (describing the franchise as the 
“ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests”); Preston v. 
Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994) (describing the franchise as “a fundamental part of our 
corporate law”).   
41813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
42Id. at 1128-1129. 
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 If the shareholders are the board’s principal, then the board is obligated to obey the 
shareholders’ wishes without considering other interests and without exercising independent 
judgment.43 This is a result that many people would prefer, but it is clearly not the law.  In 
Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp.,44 Chancellor Chandler argued that the contract in question, which 
bound the board not to renew a poison pill without shareholder approval, was not void despite 
the fact that it sterilized the board’s discretion, a feature that ordinarily invalidates a contract.  
The court reasoned, among other things, that the contract essentially permitted the shareholders, 
as principals, to make their wishes known to their agents, the board.  A month later, in further 
proceedings in the same case, the Chancellor described the earlier discussion as an “analogy” to 
agency law principles, noting that shareholders “rarely speak with one voice,” and observing that 
there may be times when a director’s duty to the corporation requires her to act against the 
shareholders’ immediate wishes.45 The board is obligated to exercise its own judgment and 
cannot abdicate its responsibilities by tossing decision-making into the shareholders’ collective 
lap.46 
Legally speaking, the principal of the board, and of anyone else exercising corporate 
powers, is the corporation.47 While the idea of the corporation as a separate legal person is now 
 
43Even under Blasius, such a relationship might be limited to governance matters and not 
extend to the board’s actions with respect to the operation of the business.  See Blasius, 564 A.2d 
at 660. 
442005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) at *8. 
45Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2006 WL 207505 (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2006) at *3. 
46See Paramount Comms., Inc., v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154 (Del. 1989). 
47See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and 
Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1074 n.4 (1983).  On the other hand, when the board is 
16 
often ridiculed as an outmoded over-simplification (at best), it is a handy shorthand term for the 
multitudinous interests involved in the profit-making enterprise.  Even leaving other 
“stakeholders” out of the picture, the shareholders still do not represent the sole corporate 
interest.  Unless there is only one shareholder, the shareholders do not have a single unitary 
interest and cannot be treated as a corporate “principal” with the board as its agent.  And even if 
the shareholders did have a single interest, any subset of the shareholders (i.e., a majority) would 
still be at best an agent of the whole group, and not a principal.  Moreover, the board’s authority 
extends to the assets legally owned by the corporation, not by the shareholders.  The 
shareholders have no power over the corporate property and therefore could not delegate that 
power to the board or anyone else.48 The shareholders also have no liability for the board’s 
 
negotiating a transaction that will result in the shareholders’ interests in the corporation being 
sold or converted, the board is literally acting on behalf of the shareholders, not the corporation, 
and is therefore the shareholders’ agent.  See In re Cox Comms., Inc., S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d 
604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 108 n.52 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
48There are some cases that treat the board as a delegate of the shareholders.  See Grimes 
v. Donald, 1995 WL 54441 at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995); Alford v. Shaw, 349 S.E.2d 41, 51 
(N.C. 1986); Appeal of Armed Forces Co-op. Insuring Assn., 625 P.2d 11, 16 (Kan. App. 1981); 
Moore v. Conover, 195 A. 833, 838 (N.J. Eq. 1937); Severance v. Heyl & Patterson, Inc., 187 A. 
53, 58 (Pa. Super. 1936). This has always been wrong; corporations, and board powers, are 
established by legislative act, and shareholders have not always even had the power to choose the 
members of the board.  The Dutch East India Company (the VOC), one of the world’s first 
modern business corporations, was organized by the Dutch States General in 1602 as a 
combination of smaller, city-based companies.  See Ella Gepken-Jager, Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC): The Dutch East India Company, in VOC 1602-2002: 400 YEARS OF 
COMPANY LAW 41, 47 (Ella Gepken-Jager et al. eds., 2005).  The business was managed by 
directors, who were appointed by governors representing the several cities (“chambers”) 
included in the combination.  See id. at 54-55.  The governors were initially appointed by the 
States General; thereafter they were supposed to be elected by large shareholders in each 
chamber but in practice they simply appointed their own successors.  See id. at 55-56.  As a 
result of complaints from investors, some accountability structures were put in place, but they 
protected only the “major shareholders”.  See id. at 57.  The Danish East India Company, 
established in 1616, did away with the chamber system in favor of direct selection of the 
governors by the “general meeting” of the shareholders; however, that system quickly changed to 
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actions, unlike a principal.  In sum, the relationship between shareholders and the board bears 
none of the indicators of a principal/agent relationship.49 
The Corporate Contract: Corporate Primacy v. Duties to Shareholders 
Although the board and shareholders are not in a principal/agent relationship, they are 
clearly in a contractual relationship, a fact which has been recognized at least since Dartmouth 
College.50 The certificate of incorporation is a contract that binds the shareholders and the 
board, subject to the requirements of the incorporation statute of the state of incorporation.  
Identifying the relationship between the board and the shareholders as contractual does not tell us 
much, of course; agency is often created by a contractual relationship as well.  It is probably 
possible to create a corporation that includes an agency relationship between the board and the 
 
one where shareholder control was made more indirect.  See Karsten Engsig Sørenson, The 
Danish East India Company, in VOC 1602-2002: 400 YEARS OF COMPANY LAW, supra, at 107, 
113-118. 
49See Benedict Sheehy, Shareholders, Unicorns and Stilts: An Analysis of Shareholder 
Property Rights, 6 J. CORP. L. STUDS. 165, 201 (2006). 
50See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627 (1819).  
See also Rogers v. Lafayette Agric. Works, 52 Ind. 296 (1875) (stating that purchase of stock 
constitutes a shareholder’s agreement to management by the board of directors).  This contract 
may be somewhat fictitious in large or established companies, where the contract was entered 
into by persons far removed from the current shareholders.  Cf. Bebchuk, supra note X, at 862-
865, 888-890 (describing lack of shareholder power to amend or control amendments to the 
charter); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 186-195 (1932) (same).  Nevertheless, the shareholders’ participation in every 
corporation actually originates with the filing of the (contractual) charter.  The corporate contract 
is therefore much more real than the social contract purportedly legitimizing government. 
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shareholders, but most corporate charters do not create any identifiable relationship between the 
parties other than shareholder/director.  Pursuant to the corporate contract, the shareholders 
commit capital to the operation of a business, and the statute provides that the business will be 
managed by a board of directors.  They are, as Professor Bainbridge has described it, joined in 
the corporate nexus.51 The shareholders have the right by statute to select and remove the board; 
this provides at least some protection for their investment.  They also have the right to approve 
fundamental changes, which are in effect amendments of the basic contract. These are important 
rights that courts will protect strenuously.52 However, they are rights created by the statute and 
charter and are therefore part of the corporate contract.  Unless a contract expressly provides 
otherwise, it does not give one party the right to control what the other party does.  Contracts 
also do not, in themselves, give rise to fiduciary duties.53 Thus, identifying the relationship as a 
contractual one tells us nothing about the fiduciary duties of the board or the amount of control 
the shareholders have over the board.  Only the terms of the contract can tell us that, and most of 
the relevant “terms” of the contract among the shareholders, board, and corporation are set by 
law.54 
The primary legal determinant of the relationship between the shareholders and the board 
is embodied in provisions such as Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation law, 
 
51See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 200. 
52See McIlquham v. Feste, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2004); Rohe 
v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190 at *11 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2000) (directors 
must be elected regularly and can be removed by the shareholders without limitation). 
53Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 901 A.2d at 114. 
54Whether those terms are mandatory or subject to change by agreement of the parties is 
not relevant to this analysis. 
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which provides that “the business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors.”55 Because the shareholders are the residual 
claimants on the corporate assets they comprise “the corporation” when everyone else is gone.  
Because the board’s duties are owed to the “corporation” or the shareholders as a group, the 
board should seek to enhance the profitability of the corporation.  As discussed above, the 
method used to enhance profitability, and the appropriate time horizon, are matters for the 
board’s discretion.56 Not only do the shareholders not have the power to interfere in the board’s 
management,57 but the shareholders’ power to hold the board to account for its actions is also 
limited.58 What should a board do, however, when the interests of the corporation – that is, 
profit maximization – conflict with those of a shareholder or group of shareholders?  This 
situation arises in a number of ways.  There are the occasional well-known cases involving 
socially responsible shareholders who seek to have the corporation cease some profitable but 
socially injurious line of business, in which the courts usually rule that such decisions are within 
the purview of the board.59 There are also the takeover cases, which state that a board may take 
action against a shareholder who poses a threat to “corporate policy and effectiveness” if the 
board’s response is proportionate to the threat and not intended to protect the incumbent 
 
55DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8 § 141(a) (year).  See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 
2000). 
56See supra notes X and accompanying text. 
57See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994). 
58See BAINBRIDGE, supra note X, at 207. 
59See, e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971) 
(holding that attempting to force Honeywell to stop manufacturing fragmentation bombs was not 
a proper purpose for a shareholder’s books and records request). 
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directors’ positions.60 Other cases have stated, at least in dicta, that a board can thwart the will 
of a majority of the shareholders, or of a sole majority shareholder, if it has a sufficiently 
compelling reason for doing so.61 
The rule preferring corporate profitability to the wishes of a subset of shareholders is 
consistent with the principle that a contract is invalid if it sterilizes the board’s discretion to act 
consistently with its fiduciary duties, unless all the shareholders agree and the corporation’s 
creditors are protected.62 To prefer the interests of some shareholders to the interests of the 
corporation as a whole (which embodies the common wealth-maximizing interests of all the 
shareholders, even if it does not embody the peculiar interests of particular shareholders) would 
be to act against the interests of the remaining shareholders.  Similarly, the law is clear that a 
board must protect the interests of a minority shareholder from injury caused by a majority 
shareholder.63 Even a director who was named to the board by a specific shareholder is 
 
60See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
61See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 299, 304, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994); Blasius Industries 
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. 1988) (blocking shareholder vote for directors); Phillips 
v. Insituform of North America, Inc., 1987 WL 16285 at *6, *7, *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987) 
(diluting majority shareholder’s holdings). 
62See infra note X. 
63See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919-920 (Del. 2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
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obligated to act in the interests of all the shareholders or the corporation as a whole,64 and can, 
unless the charter specifies otherwise, be removed for cause by the other shareholders.65 
There are, however, a few cases that seem to contradict the corporate-primacy principle. 
In VGS, Inc. v. Castiel66 the board of the company (an LLC) consisted of three directors: the 
majority shareholder (Castiel), his designee, and the minority shareholder.  The minority 
shareholder convinced the Castiel designee that Castiel’s control was bad for the company, and 
they cooked up a scheme to eliminate his control.  “Many LLC employees, and even some of 
Castiel’s lieutenants, testified that they believed it to be in the LLC’s best interest to take control 
from Castiel.”67 Nevertheless, the court held that the two members of the board had “failed to 
discharge their duty of loyalty to [Castiel] in good faith”.68 The relevant fact in VGS, however, is 
that the board acted without notice to Castiel, another director, because if it had provided notice 
he would have instantly exercised his right to remove his designee from the board and appoint 
someone more loyal to him.  In doing this, he would have been acting as a shareholder and he 
 
64See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 923; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 
(Del. 1983); Phillips v. Insituform of No. America, Inc., 1987 WL 16285 at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
27, 1987). 
65See Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. 
July 21, 2000). 
662000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
67Id. at *2. 
68Id. at *4 (emphasis added).  See also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., v. Benihana, Inc., 891 
A.2d 150, 185 n.215 (stating that a director’s seeking to dilute the position of a majority owner 
who might pose a threat to the corporation “could constitute an improper purpose” for action). 
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would not have been bound by fiduciary duties.69 In other words, the secret board action had the 
primary motive of depriving a shareholder of his right to vote for directors, which, under 
Blasius70, constitutes a breach of the directors’ duty in the absence of a compelling 
justification.71 
In other cases where individual shareholders or groups of shareholders had the right, by 
contract or pursuant to the certificate of incorporation, to appoint one or more directors, courts 
have recognized that those directors are intended to serve a specific function benefiting the 
individual shareholder and not necessarily the corporation as a whole.72 Courts have held that 
director-designees have the right to share information obtained from their board positions with 
the shareholders who appointed them,73 and that it was reasonable for a board to consult a 40% 
 
69See 2000 WL 1277372 at *4.  See also Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Cincinnati v. 
Woodlawn Canners, Inc., 1983 WL 18017 at *15-16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1983) (holding that a 
44% shareholder was entitled to vote in its own interest even if doing so caused substantial harm 
to the corporation). 
70564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).  See supra notes X and accompanying text. 
71Professor Eisenberg convincingly argues that the board in VGS violated its duty of good 
faith by manipulating the corporate process in a way that violates corporate norms.  See 
Eisenberg, supra note X, at 51-57.  He does not discuss Blasius.
72See Moore Business Forms, Inc., v. Cordant Holdings Corp., 1996 WL 307444 at *6 
(Del. Ch. June 4, 1996) (noting that purpose of shareholder’s right to designate director was to 
protect the shareholder’s interests which were different from, and might conflict with, those of 
corporation).  See also Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., 891 A.2d at 165 n.76, 166, 187 (discussing 
position of director-designees). 
73See Moore Business Forms, Inc., v. Cordant Holdings Corp., 1996 WL 307444 at *4 
(Del. Ch. June 4, 1996); Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 121 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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shareholder before acting.74 The courts, at least in Delaware, seem to take a pragmatic approach, 
protecting the bargained-for rights of individual shareholders vis-a-vis the corporation, but 
protecting the corporation and other shareholders when those individual rights create conflicts 
that were not specifically foreseen or foreseeable at the time the special rights were established.75 
In sum, the law elevates the interest of the corporation above the interests of any single 
shareholder and even above the interests of the shareholders as a group unless the corporate 
contract provides otherwise.76 
III.  The Close Corporation Shareholder Debate, Again
The Enron scandals have cast some interesting light on the debate over shareholder 
fiduciary duties.  First, the arguments in favor of controlling shareholders owing fiduciary duties 
tend to be based on the vulnerable position of minority shareholders, of whom the archetype is 
Euphemia Donahue.77 Close corporations are usually defined as those with “a small number of 
stockholders, the absence of a market for the corporation’s stock, and substantial shareholder 
 
74See In re Western Nat’l Corp. Shareholders Litig., 2000 WL 10192 at *8 (Del. Ch. 
2000).  But see McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 924 (Del. 2000) (holding that directors must 
use independent judgment in making decision regardless of interests of controlling shareholder). 
75Cf. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 1996 WL 307444 at *6 (noting that conflict of interest 
was foreseen); McIlquham v. Feste, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2002) 
(refusing to protect majority shareholder’s right to control board when right had not been 
bargained for at the time minority shareholder received right to designate directors). 
76See Strine, supra note X, at ___; Brownstein and Kerman, supra note X, at 42-45; 
Brudney, supra note X.  The right of shareholders to elect and remove directors is, of course, 
part of the corporate contract.  
77See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
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participation in the management of the corporation”.78 In a close corporation, shareholders 
“usually expect employment and a meaningful role in management, as well as a return on the 
money paid for [their] shares.”79 Because of the majority-rule nature of the corporation, the 
majority shareholder, through control of the board of directors, “has the ability to take actions 
that are harmful to the minority shareholders’ interests.”80 “Standard [abusive] techniques 
include the refusal to declare dividends, the termination of a minority shareholder’s employment, 
the removal of a minority shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of 
corporate earnings through high compensation to the majority shareholder.”81 The minority 
shareholder is faced with an “indefinite future with no return on the capital he or she contributed 
to the enterprise,”82 and, unlike a shareholder in a public corporation, cannot “simply sell[] its 
shares on the market.”83 
In contrast, let us consider the situation of those fortunate shareholders in public 
corporations, such as the shareholder-employees of Enron or WorldCom.  Most of their wealth 
was tied up in stock of their employer, and they were dependent for cash flow on employment by 
the company because the companies did not pay dividends.  They were at the mercy of 
management, who were able to extract cash from the company in ways the “minority” were not, 
such as through high compensation, other perquisites of office, and self-dealing.  When 
 
78Moll, supra note X, at 888. 
79Id. (quoting Thompson, supra note X, at 702). 
80Id. at 889. 
81Id. at 890. 
82Id. at 891 (quoting Thompson, supra note X, at 703). 
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management’s wrongdoing was exposed, their employment was terminated, their investments 
became worthless, and they had no ready market for their shares.  This is exactly the predicament 
in which Mrs. Donahue found herself.84 
One might argue that the Enron shareholder-employees made their own beds by failing to 
diversify their retirement account holdings.  By investing solely or primarily in the stock of their 
employer, they voluntarily (although perhaps unwisely) sealed their fate.  The same is true of 
“oppressed” shareholders in close corporations, however, who willingly (although perhaps 
unwisely) chose to invest as minority shareholders.85 Furthermore, the fact of shareholder 
participation in management, which is generally treated as a feature of closely held 
corporations,86 is rapidly increasing as a feature of publicly held corporations as well.  This 
phenomenon takes two forms, and each form raises a number of issues, as discussed below.  It 
also serves to demonstrate that the argument in favor of shareholder fiduciary duties based on the 
uniqueness of the position of shareholders in close corporations rests on a false premise.87 
83Id. 
84Actually, Mrs. Donahue was better off than the Enron employees.  She continued to 
hold shares in a valuable company, although she was unable to liquidate her investment at a price 
she liked.  If she had retained her stock, she might eventually have earned a substantial return 
when the company was sold or liquidated.  
85Some minority shareholders wind up in that position because their public company has 
been taken over by a controlled corporation, but in that case the law governing takeovers protects 
them.  See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) 
Some people inherit their minority shares, in which case it is difficult to see why they should not 
also inherit the unfavorable contractual position assented to by their forebears. 
86See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511; Moll, supra note X, at 888. 
87I have made this argument previously; the Enron scandals merely illustrate my point.  
See Dalley, supra note X, at 193-199. 
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IV.  Shareholder Activism Part I
The more interesting post-Enron development involves the blossoming of shareholder 
activism, a bud that has hung tantalizingly from the vine for many years.88 The term 
“shareholder activism” is often used loosely to mean anything done by a shareholder in a public 
company other than passively voting with management.  However, shareholder activism comes 
in two varieties: efforts by institutional investors (usually mutual and pension funds) and 
reformers to improve corporate governance, often by removing anti-takeover devices; and efforts 
by large individual investors or hedge funds to cause specific changes in the way the company is 
being run.89 I discuss each of these in turn. 
 Lucian Bebchuk’s proposal to give shareholders more power in corporate governance is a 
hot controversy on the academic corporate law circuit these days.90 Bebchuk proposes that 
 
88In 1992, the SEC adopted new rules for disclosure of executive compensation intended 
to “improve shareholders’ understanding of all forms of compensation paid to senior executives 
and directors, the criteria used by the board of directors in reaching compensation decisions, and 
the degree of relationship between compensation and corporate performance. . . .”  Executive 
Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Rel. No. 31327, Oct. 16, 1992, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1992 Transfer Binder ¶ 85,056 at 83,416.  On the same day, the SEC adopted rules to 
remove “unnecessary government interference in discussions among shareholders of corporate 
performance and other matters of direct interest to all shareholders.”  Regulation of 
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Rel. No. 31326, Oct. 16, 1992, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1992 Transfer Binder ¶85,501 at 83,353.  It was widely understood that the latter 
set of rules would permit, if not encourage, increased involvement in corporate governance 
matters by institutional investors. 
89See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control 15-17 (July 2006), U. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 06-
16, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881. 
90See generally Bebchuk, supra note X; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Empowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Strine, supra note X. 
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shareholders be given greater power in “rules of the game” matters – changes to the governance 
provisions in the certificate of incorporation – which are traditionally within the shareholders’ 
vetitive jurisdiction (although that jurisdiction is coincident with the board’s).91 He also 
proposes that shareholders be given the power to choose, in advance, to make certain business 
decisions,92 and to initiate “end of the road” decisions such as sale or dissolution of the 
company.93 Leaving aside the merits of these proposals, they raise questions about the fiduciary 
duties that would attend the shareholders’ increased powers.94 Shareholder power over rules-of-
the-game decisions seems innocuous enough.  Institutional investors have been making 
governance proposals for years.95 As Bebchuk notes, those proposals often do not result in 
actual change, even when they receive a majority vote of the shareholders.96 This is because 
changes to the certificate of incorporation require board, as well as shareholder, approval.97 
Bebchuk wants to change this rule. 
 As noted above, the certificate of incorporation is a contract to which shareholders are 
deemed to be parties by virtue of their share ownership.98 Unlike most contracts, this contract 
 
91See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 865. 
92See id. at 892. 
93See id. at 895-896, 901. 
94Vice Chancellor Strine at least implicitly recognizes these problems.  See Strine, supra 
note X, at ____. 
95See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 15-16. 
96See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 852-856. 
97See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(b)(1). 
98See Centaur Partners IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990). 
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can be changed without a party’s consent, but it must be done with the approval of both the 
board and a majority of the shareholders.  The shareholders do not owe any duties when they do 
this, but the board does.  In fact, the board’s duties when tinkering with governance are 
heightened.99 If a majority of the shareholders has the power to change the certificate 
unilaterally, the dissenting shareholders will lose the protection provided, at least theoretically, 
by the board’s duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and all the shareholders.100 This 
problem may sound more theoretical than actual, but it could cause real harm to dissenting 
shareholders.101 In fact, the board’s fiduciary duties are the only protection for minority 
 
99See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 
1994); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995). 
100See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 40.  The board’s duty to prevent charter 
amendments that are not in the best interests of the corporation and all its shareholders is 
explored in Brownstein & Kirman, supra note X, at 42-45. Some of the language in Blasius 
Industries Inc., 564 A.2d at 660, suggests that a board is always obligated to respect the 
expressed wishes of a majority of the shareholders on a corporate governance matter.  Because 
the Delaware statute gives the power to initiate a charter amendment to the board, however, it 
would be odd, at least, to hold that the board did not have discretion in exercising that power.  
See also supra Part II. 
101Suppose I am a shareholder in a publicly traded company with a staggered board, and I 
like the staggered board because I do not want the company be taken over (perhaps because I 
live in the town where it has its headquarters, or because of my tax situation).  In fact, I 
purchased the shares, and became subject to the terms of the certificate of incorporation, 
knowing about the staggered board.  Corporate law allows those contract terms to be changed 
without my consent if the board and a majority of the shareholders agree.  Although the majority 
of the shareholders can act selfishly to change the certificate to, for example, cause a short-term 
improvement in the price of the stock by increasing the likelihood of a takeover, the board must 
consider the interests of the corporation as a whole.  It may believe, for example, that the 
staggered board, together with a poison pill, gives it power to negotiate with a bidder to protect 
shareholder interests, like mine, in a takeover, and therefore refuse to remove the staggered 
board provisions.  As a “minority” shareholder, I am protected by the board’s veto.  
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shareholders in states that (correctly) do not impose duties on controlling shareholders.102 If the 
shareholders are to get the power to act unilaterally to legally bind all the other shareholders 
through an amendment to the corporate charter, they should also be subject to some 
corresponding duty.  One option is to apply the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing to 
shareholders’ acting to change the certificate of incorporation.  This rule would recognize that 
the shareholders are exercising a contract right that may affect the other parties’ legitimate 
expectations under the existing contract.103 Alternatively, the dissenting shareholders could be 
given appraisal rights, which is consistent with the current rule giving shareholders appraisal 
rights when they dissent from a merger, which is a change in the fundamental terms of their 
investment without their consent.104 
Bebchuk’s “let the shareholders make business decisions” proposal is more troubling.  
Delaware law provides that shareholders may elect to manage the corporation in statutory close 
corporations, but when they do so they are subject to the same duties as directors.105 This rule 
should apply to any shareholder or group of shareholders that takes control in lieu of the board, 
even in a public company, for the same reason:  whoever has power over the corporate property 
owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and all its shareholders.  Bebchuk’s proposal is 
 
102See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000); Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1994). 
103See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH § 2.3.3 
(1995). 
104Originally, mergers required a unanimous vote of the shareholders.  Appraisal rights 
compensated the shareholders for the loss of their veto power.  See WILLIAM J. CARNEY,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19 (2000). 
105See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 351 (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351). 
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somewhat less radical than full shareholder control.  He proposes that shareholders be able to 
specify in advance that they (and not the board) will have the power to make certain business 
decisions, including those involving acquisitions, distributions, and executive compensation.106 
In effect, Bebchuk is typing to give the shareholders the power of a principal to control its agent, 
the board.  As noted above, this is not the existing legal relationship between the shareholders 
and the board.  That relationship could be changed, of course, and that is the essence of 
Bebchuk’s proposal.  Under that proposal, however, a group of the shareholders – the majority –  
would be given authority to bind, and therefore become the agent of, the whole group or the 
corporation.  That majority should therefore be subject to an agent’s fiduciary duties when 
exercising those discrete powers.107 
How might this work in practice?  Bebchuk anticipates that the business decisions that 
shareholders are most likely to take over are those that are “game-ending” (such as a sale of the 
company) and “scaling down” (such as the spin-off of a division or a distribution of cash-on-
hand),108 because those are decisions in which agency costs between shareholders and 
management are particularly high.109 However he acknowledges that under his proposal any 
decision is eligible to be taken over by the shareholders.110 So, for example, the shareholders of 
 
106See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 895. 
107In the usual case, a majority shareholder does not owe fiduciary duties because it does 
not have any legal power over anyone.  See Dalley, supra note X, at 207.  Under Bebchuk’s 
proposal, a majority of the shareholders would have legal power and should therefore be subject 
to concomitant duties. 
108See Bebchuk, supra note X, at 892. 
109See id. at 895. 
110See id. 
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a corporation might add a provision to the certificate of incorporation requiring that the 
corporation distribute as a dividend all cash in excess of some amount.  The point of this 
provision would be to prevent management from engaging in “empire-building”.111 The board, 
however, may believe that technological advances are likely to result in increased competitive 
pressures in the intermediate term, and that “hoarding cash” is important to protecting the long-
term viability of the business.112 Alternatively, the board may be (quietly) pursuing a business 
opportunity that would provide an attractive rate of return on a cash investment.  In either case, 
the board will be unable to fulfill its fiduciary duty to act in what it believes to be the best 
interests of the corporation and all its shareholders, because a majority of the shareholders have 
eliminated its  discretion with respect to certain aspects of the business.  This is a gross violation 
of fundamental corporate principles, which invalidate restrictions on the board’s ability to act 
consistently with its fiduciary obligations.113 Although such a restriction in the certificate of 
incorporation would probably be valid under current law,114 under current law the certificate can 
only be amended with the board’s approval115 – approval that is itself subject to fiduciary 
 
111See id. at 902. 
112See, e.g., Aaron O. Patrick, James Murdoch Opens the Wallet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 
2006, at C1. 
113See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934); Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 51.  Nor would this provision fall under Galler v. Galler, 
203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964), which validated restrictions on the directors that were agreed to by 
all the shareholders. 
114See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §§ 102(b)(1), 141(a)(1). 
115See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(b)(1).    
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standards.  Bebchuk’s proposal would give the power to hamstring the board to a majority of the 
shareholders acting unilaterally.116 
When a board makes decisions, it has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and all its shareholders.  The decision is protected by the business judgment rule, 
however, if it is made by a fully informed and disinterested board acting in good faith.  What 
about the shareholders?  Must their decision be fully informed, disinterested, and in good faith?  
It is not clear that the shareholders would be subject to any fiduciary duty in making their 
decision, and therefore that they would be under any obligation to become informed117 or to 
make the decision in the best interests of the corporation.  Traditionally, shareholders have been 
permitted to act completely selfishly when voting, even in the presence of conflicts of interest.118 
Furthermore, it would be impossible to impose fiduciary duties on the ephemeral majority of 
shareholders who made the decision to amend the certificate.119 The fact that the shareholders’ 
decision to take control of an issue must occur in advance makes it even more difficult to hold 
 
116Not surprisingly, corporate executives have taken a dim view of giving shareholders 
control over even rules-of-the-game decisions, arguing that “you run the risk of a . . . board being 
unable to make bold decisions that are unpopular with any of these constituencies [e.g., pension 
funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds] but in the best interests of the company.”  Alan Murray, 
CEOs Get Off the Ropes on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at A2 (quoting John 
Castellani, President of the Business Roundtable). 
117The debate over Bebchuk’s proposals has given considerable attention to the question 
whether shareholders would become adequately informed.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note X, at 
880-882; Bainbridge, supra note X, at 1745.  I make a different argument:  they should have a 
duty to become adequately informed. 
118See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at ___. 
119Similar considerations have been used to argue against shareholder liability for a 
corporation’s torts.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 40-44 (1991). 
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them accountable for their decisions, since any adverse effects of their decision will not be felt 
until many of the outstanding shares will have changed hands.  It also reduces the likelihood that 
the shareholders will be making informed decisions appropriate to the circumstances, and it 
removes the board’s ability to act quickly with respect to those business matters the shareholders 
have chosen to govern.  Bebchuk’s proposal is troubling because it would give shareholders 
power without subjecting them to a concomitant duty and would thereby create an unaccountable 
power-holder, something previously unknown to fiduciary law.120 
V.  Shareholder Activism Part II
However interesting they may be, Bebchuk’s proposals are merely proposals, and they 
are unlikely to become law anytime soon.  To the extent institutional shareholders are in fact 
seeking to improve corporate governance, they are doing so through existing legal procedures, 
and dissenting shareholders are protected by the board’s fiduciary duties.  Other shareholders, 
primarily hedge funds, are seeking to participate in management by exerting direct moral control 
over the board, which raises questions about the fiduciary duties of the board members who may 
respond to that control.  Examples of this trend appear in the business pages every day, and 
include such corporate icons as General Motors, Time Warner, and McDonald’s.121 Because 
shareholders do not manage the corporation, these shareholders seek to control the board, using 
persuasion, threats, and public exhortation.  Often they succeed in placing one or more directors 
 
120Moreover, one cannot argue that the shareholders are not subject to duties when 
exercising control because it is “their” property they are controlling – in other words, that they 
are the principal, not the agent, and they are merely seeking to control their agent, the board – for 
the reasons described in Part II above. 
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on the board.  As discussed above, directors owe a duty to exercise independent judgment in the 
best interests of the corporation no matter who appointed them.122 When Kerkorian’s hand-
picked director on the GM board votes the way Kerkorian wants him to vote rather than 
exercising his own judgment, has the director violated a duty?123 These shareholders are not 
engaging in battles about repealing poison pills or appointing an independent lead director, 
matters which at least arguably relate to the balance of power between shareholders and the 
board and are therefore legitimate shareholder concerns.  These are battles about the way the 
company is being run, including how best to realize value for the shareholders and whether to 
realize that value in the short term (as some hedge funds and other investors would prefer) or 
long term (as management or long-time family owners may prefer).124 In other words, these are 
decisions generally covered by the business judgment rule, as long as the board is reasonably 
informed and a majority of the board is disinterested, and the activist shareholders involved are 
seeking to treat the board as their agents – that is, subject to their control.  
 
121For an excellent discussion of the phenomenon see Kahan & Rock supra note X. 
122See supra note X and accompanying text.  See also Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 
F.2d 36, 45-46 (3rd Cir. 1947). 
123This example is hypothetical.  Kerkorian’s director, Jerome York, has expertise in the 
industry and may very well have been selected by Kerkorian because he valued York’s own 
judgment.  Other GM directors have expressed enthusiasm for York’s presence.  However, 
York’s contract entitles him to 4% of any gains Kerkorian realizes on his GM stock, so York’s 
interests – and loyalties – are clearly intended to be aligned with Kerkorian’s.  See Monica 
Langley, Newest Director Shakes Up GM with Calls for Radical Change, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 
2006 at A1.  See also Paul Ingrassia, Kerkorian Motors, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at A24 
(describing York as Kerkorian’s “advisor”); Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Who’s Running GM?,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at A25 (treating Kerkorian as the motivating force and noting York’s 
agreement with him). 
124See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 46-50 (discussing possible “short-termism” by 
hedge funds). 
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 There are a number of questions one might ask about this sort of shareholder activity.  Is 
it un-American, violating the principles of corporate enterprise that helped make this nation 
great?125 Is it a welcome check on the increasingly unresponsive management of public 
companies?126 Is it a pointless waste of management time and attention because shareholders 
cannot possibly have the information, incentives, and expertise necessary to make better 
decisions than current management?127 Does it contribute to the rise of the “shareholder primacy 
norm” and therefore to the kind of behavior that led to the millennial financial scandals?128 
These are all interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this Article.  My focus here is 
two related issues:  What duties are owed by the representative of that shareholder on the board? 
And does the activist investor risk liability when, as a shareholder, it interferes in management 
decisions? 
 As noted above, fiduciary duties arise from a person’s exercise of legal power over 
another’s person or property, but do not arise from moral control.  The fiduciary with legal 
power over the corporation is the board; a shareholder does not have legal power over the 
corporate property, although it may have moral control over members of the board.  
Shareholders, whether controlling or not, are not “principals” of the board and therefore have no 
 
125See Bainbridge, supra note [UCLA] at 619-628. 
126See Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 3; Bebchuk, supra note X, at 862-865.  See also 
Gilson and Gordon, supra note X, at 785 (arguing that controlling shareholders can monitor 
management and serve to reduce agency problems between management and shareholders). 
127See Bainbridge, supra note [UCLA] at 624. 
128See Karmel, supra note X, at 7-9.  See also Kahan & Rock, supra note X, at 46-50 
(discussing short-termism). 
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legal control over the board.  Therefore, they must act by influencing the board.129 The first 
issue is therefore what duties are owed by a shareholder’s designee on the board. 
 As discussed in Part II, above, the board owes its duties to the corporation and all its 
shareholders.  This is true not only for the board as a whole, but also for any single board 
member, including those designated by minority shareholders.  One might argue that it is 
acceptable for such designees to represent their shareholders’ interests because, as minority 
board members, they cannot do any harm and because they may do some good by presenting a 
different perspective that is less deferential to management.  The latter argument has some merit, 
but it begs the question.  The alternative perspective that the designee presents must be a 
perspective on what is best for the corporation or it will not add value to board decision-making.  
The former argument, that designees can be allowed to act as their shareholders direct because 
they pose no threat to the corporation, fails to recognize the process by which boards operate.  
Board members can act only as a group; a single board member has no authority to act for the 
corporation.  Although most boards act by majority rule,130 in practice boards generally operate 
by consensus.131 Thus, a single director on a board of more than two will be unable, legally, to 
cause the corporation to do anything.  This merely restates the proposition that, as a legal matter, 
no director or group of directors can cause the corporation to do anything; only the full board can 
do that. 
 
129See Dalley, supra note X, at 207-211. 
130See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(b). 
131See Strine, supra note X, at ____. 
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 As a practical matter, however, some directors may exercise more moral control than 
others where, for example, the director is sufficiently persuasive and strong-willed and the rest of 
the board is malleable or deferential.132 In that case, the resulting board action will appear to 
have been – legally must have been – taken by the board as a whole, and it will be difficult to 
prove that a single director was the instigator of the decision.133 Lone directors occasionally 
make their individual views known, but only when they are dissenting from actions taken by the 
board.134 In other words, we will rarely know whether a designated director has exercised any 
 
132See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Board as a Collective Body or a Collection of Individuals: 
Implications for Director Liability (July 2006), Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 06-
25, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918119 at 21, 24, 26 (discussing situations in which a 
single director is likely to influence the outcome of a decision).  See also Paul Ingressia, 
Kerkorian Motors, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006 at A24 (observing that if Carlos Ghosn, automotive 
management genius, were on the GM board he would have “enormous influence”).  The fact that 
boards have responded to the demands of activist investors suggests that a shareholder-designee 
on a board, when backed by a noisy investor, may have considerable moral power.  See Kahan 
and Rock, supra note X, at __ (describing successful activism).  Moreover, if shareholder-
designees are generally unable to affect corporate affairs, one wonders why activist investors so 
frequently ask for board representation.  Of course, board representation also gives a shareholder 
access to inside information which could be used in managing the shareholder’s investments (if it 
were not illegal to do so). 
133There is therefore unlikely to be much litigation about the fiduciary duties of a single 
director representing a minority (although noisy) shareholder.  The question is not merely 
academic, however.  Directors need to know what they are supposed to do, even if they are 
unlikely to be sued for not doing it.  Cf. Eisenberg, supra note X, at 26 (noting that the duty of 
good faith is important despite the fact that its breach does not create liability). 
134In 2004, the SEC adopted rules to require that issuers disclose the fact that a director 
has resigned because of a dispute with the board or management and publish any correspondence 
between the departing director and the issuer.  See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities Act Rel. No. 8400, _____, 2004, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] ¶87,158 at 89,508.  Describing the operation of 
the rule, former Chairman Harvey Pitt noted that part of its value was that it provided individual 
directors with “leverage,” presumably to be used to pressure boards to do the right thing.  See 
Phyllis Plitch, New SEC Rules Show Underbelly of Corporations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at 
B4A. 
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real control in any given decision, and in most cases it will be the board as a whole that will be 
judged.135 There are cases, however, where the influence of a single director or small group of 
directors not only causes change, but is known publicly to have done so.136 This is especially 
likely to occur when a director has a separate agenda.137 
If shareholder’s designees owe duties to the corporation and the shareholders as a 
whole,138 what do those duties entail?  The usual standard of care is generally stated to be that of 
the ordinary prudent person in the same or similar circumstances.139 The operation of the 
business judgment rule protects a decision if it is made by an independent, informed board acting 
in what it believes in good faith to be the best interests of the corporation.140 A director who 
merely rubber-stamps the decision of management has failed in her duty of care because she has 
not exercised her own independent, informed judgment.141 A director that serves only as a 
shareholder’s mouthpiece has similarly failed to exercise her own independent, informed 
judgment and therefore has breached her fiduciary duty. 
 
135See Ibrahim, supra note X, at 8-9. 
136See id. at 26.  See also Phred Dvorak and Jaclyne Badal, Relative Problems, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 2006, at B1 (describing influence of members of founding families on company 
management).  Cf. Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 WL 48746 at *3 (Del. Ch.) (refusing 
to infer control where shareholder had four of ten seats on board and power to veto transaction). 
137See Ibrahim, supra note X, at 21, 24, 26. 
138See supra notes X and accompanying text. See also, Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May 
Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L.515, 555-558 (2001). 
139See e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §401(a) 
(1994). 
140See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) 
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 The next question is, which fiduciary duty is implicated when a director-designee does 
the shareholder’s bidding without exercising independent judgment?142 In Delaware, a breach of 
the duty of care generally involves a failure to become reasonably informed143 or gross 
negligence generally.144 A director who does her shareholder’s bidding without becoming fully 
informed probably violates that duty.145 If she becomes fully informed, perhaps out of curiosity, 
but fails to exercise her independent judgment in the best interests of the corporation, she will 
not have breached her duty of care but may have breached either her duty of loyalty or her duty 
of good faith, or perhaps both.  The Delaware Supreme Court has recently stated that “intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” constitutes a breach of the 
duty of good faith.146 “A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the 
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
 
141See In re Walt Disney Deriv. Litig., 2005 Del Ch. LEXIS 113 at *191 n.487, quoted in 
Eisenberg, supra note X, at 28-29. 
142See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del. 2000); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 
162 F.2d 36, 46 (3rd Cir. 1947).  Lest one think that all shareholder designees are in fact noble 
and independent-minded people who will not be influenced by the shareholder who nominated 
them, I note that when the Tribune Company board voted on its stock buyback, all seven 
independent directors and the CEO voted in favor, while the three directors appointed by the 
Chandler family (one of whom was Mr. Chandler) voted no.  See Dennis K. Berman & Sarah 
Ellison, Tribune Buyback Draws Opposition from Chandlers, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006, at A1.  
That seems remarkably coincidental. 
143See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., ___ A.2d ___, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. 2006) 
at *22. 
144See id. at *25. 
145See Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. The Reader’s Digest Ass’n., Inc., 2002 WL 
31835461 at *3 (Del.). 
146In re Walt Disney Deriv. Litig., 2006 WL 1562466 at *26. 
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corporation . . . .”147 A director’s following the instructions of a shareholder, rather than 
exercising her own judgment about what is in the best interests of the corporation and all its 
shareholders, would appear to fall squarely within this definition of bad faith.148 Incumbent 
directors have in fact used the prospect of such misplaced loyalty to fight shareholder nominees, 
arguing that they will not “think independently and vote their own conscience” or act as 
“independent voices accountable to all shareholders.”149 
The question whether such a director also violates her duty of loyalty is more difficult.  
Loyalty entails two concepts that are essentially reverse images of each other: interest and 
independence.  An interested director is not independent; neither is a director who is “dominated 
and controlled” by an interested person.150 A director is dominated and controlled when she is 
“beholden” to an interested person and “so under [that person’s] influence that [her] discretion 
would be sterilized.”151 Merely owing one’s position as a director to another does not make one 
beholden to that person,152 but more substantial financial ties, such as a situation in which the 
 
147Id. at *27. 
148This might not apply when the activist shareholder is herself sitting on the board, 
because she presumably made her investment, or decided to become active, out of a belief that 
her views constituted the best interests of the corporation, at least in some sense.  See Kahan and 
Rock, supra note X, at ___. 
149See Heinz Questions Peltz/Trian Director Slate, Dow Jones Newswires, July 17, 2006; 
UPDATE: Heinz Sharpens Criticism of Peltz Board Nominees, Dow Jones Newswires, July 17, 
2006.  See also Aaron O. Patrick, Aegis Holders are Advised to Oppose Bollore’s Moves, Wall 
Street Journal Online, June 6, 2006. 
150See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257 (Del. 2000). 
151Rales v. Blasband, 634 A,2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993). 
152See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 175, 177 (Del. Ch. 
2005). 
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director’s full-time employment was within another’s control, might.153 However, the fact that a 
director is dominated and controlled by another is only relevant if the other person is herself 
“interested”. 
 “Interest” is usually defined as a financial interest not shared by other shareholders.154 
Broadly speaking, however, a conflict of interest can arise from any circumstance that impairs 
the director’s ability to make a decision “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the 
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”155 Thus, while a director-designee 
may not meet the usual definition of interest in a transaction not directly involving the 
designating shareholder, she probably is not independent either.156 Moreover, in many cases the 
interests of the activist shareholder and those of all the shareholders as a group may diverge.157 
Whether the shareholder’s divergent interest is sufficient to taint her designee on the board will 
depend on the seriousness of the conflict.  In many cases, the activist’s interest will be different 
from but not directly conflicting with the interests of the rest of the shareholders.  In that case, 
the director will not be interested even if she is dominated and controlled by the shareholder.  
She will not be independent, but mere lack of independence probably does not constitute a 
 
153See id. at 177. 
154See Eisenberg, supra note X, at 27-28. 
155Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. 
156See In re Emerging Comms., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 at *39 & nn. 183-
184 (Del. Ch.). 
157See Kahan and Rock, supra note X, at ___; Jason Singer, In Twist for Private Buyouts, 
Some Shareholders Fight Back, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2006, at A1; Jesse Eisinger, Long & 
Short: Minority Shareholders in Sears Canada Win This Round of Ackman vs. Lampert, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 16, 2006, at C1. 
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breach of the duty of loyalty where a director is not interested.158 In sum, the director-designee, 
if acting as a mouthpiece for her shareholder, probably violates her duties of care159 and good 
faith.160 A similar analysis would apply where any director is seeking to protect any interest 
other than that of the corporation writ large.161 
This analysis suggests that there are a lot of breaches of the fiduciary duty of good faith 
occurring across corporate America.  Every time a director does what someone else suggests 
without exercising independent judgment she breaches her duty.  When directors act without 
independent judgment out of laziness, spinelessness, or psychological or structural “bias”162, they 
may breach their duties of care if they are grossly negligent.  However, they are usually not 
liable for that breach because of the business judgment rule.  But when they act without 
independent thought out of loyalty to another, they violate the duty of good faith and they are not 
protected by the business judgment rule.  Of course, they will not actually be liable for anything 
unless something bad can be shown to have occurred as a result of their breach.  Activist 
investors have been successful in causing changes at a number of companies in the past few 
years.163 If the board, including designated directors, acted out of loyalty to or fear of an activist 
 
158See Eisenberg, supra note X, at 58. 
159See supra notes X and accompanying text. 
160See Eisenberg, supra note X, at 57-61, 66-67. 
161See id. 
162See Oracle, 824 A.2d at 938-943 (considering the subtle influences that social and 
professional connections can have on decision-making and the reasons therefor); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984). 
163See Kahan and Rock, supra note X, at ___. 
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shareholder, or even simply because it was tired of listening to the whining of an activist 
investor, it has breached its duties and may, in an extreme case, face liability.164 
So how does this relate to the duty of shareholders?  If a director violates a fiduciary duty 
because she acts out of loyalty to an individual shareholder and not to the company, the 
shareholder should be equally liable for complicity in the breach.  This can be vicarious liability 
under agency principles or aiding and abetting liability.  The latter treatment merely implicates 
the general principle that one who aids or instigates a breach of duty is also liable for the 
breach.165 The former treatment, however, raises another interesting problem in corporate law.  
Case law states expressly that directors are not agents of the shareholders who elect them.166 
This rule would be better phrased as, “Directors had better not be agents of the shareholders who 
elect them, or they are in deep trouble.”167 Agency requires that the agent be under the control of 
the principal.  A director who is doing her job is not under the control of anyone – that is the 
essence of independent judgment.  So, when a director acts out of loyalty to another, not only has 
she violated her fiduciary duty, she may have acted as an agent of the other person.168 There is 
no reason to deny automatically the existence of an agency relationship, and therefore of 
vicarious liability, in that situation.  
 
164See Ibrahim, supra note X, at 22-25 (discussing potential liability where only one 
director breaches a duty of good faith). 
165See In re General Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 2005 WL 1089021 at *23 (Del. Ch. 
May 4, 2005); Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 1989 WL 48746 at *4. 
166See Dalley, supra note X, at 219. 
167See id. 




In sum, a corporate act undertaken on behalf of a specific shareholder (any shareholder) 
that injures the other shareholders or the corporation itself entails a breach of fiduciary duty by 
the directors who so acted, and the instigating shareholder is also liable for that breach under 
basic agency principles.  No “shareholder fiduciary duty” is implicated.  Existing law, properly 
applied, not only addresses the problem of harmful corporate169 acts, it also does so without 
doing violence to the principle that shareholders do not manage (and therefore do not owe duties 
to) the corporation.  Suppose instead that we adopt the view that shareholders owe duties to the 
corporation and other shareholders.  When is this duty implicated?  When the noisy investor 
begins pressuring the board?  When the investor votes?  That is clearly within her rights as a 
shareholder.  The only way an investor can cause harm is by controlling the board.  So the law 
finds and punishes the breach when and where it happens – when the board members act 
disloyally. 
 This analysis is not new.  What is new is the number of instances of directors of publicly 
traded corporations, hitherto not the subject of shareholder fiduciary duty analysis, making 
business decisions directed by individual shareholders.  The duties of those directors, and the 
 
169If the act is not a corporate act, but is a shareholder act such as a shareholder selling 
her shares or voting for a director or in favor of a merger, no fiduciary duties apply at all, and the 
injured party, if there is one, is out of luck. 
45 
potential responsibility of the shareholders who appoint them, are therefore of heightened 
importance. 
